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1How well did the Kyoto Protocol work? A dynamic-GMM 
approach with external instruments  
Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. With this aim a 
dynamic panel data model is estimated for a cross-section of 213 countries over the period 
1960 to 2009. The model, based on a STIRPAT approach, also integrates the EKC approach 
and specifically considers the endogeneity of the policy variable. To sort out causality the 
number of financed CDM projects is used as an external instrument. The main results indicate 
that obligations from the Kyoto Protocol have a measurable reducing effect on CO2
 
 emissions 
and indicate that a treaty often seen as "failed" in fact may be producing some non-trivial 
effects. 
Keywords: Environmental Kuznets Curve, Kyoto Protocol, panel data, Clean Development 
Mechanism 
JEL Classification: Q54 Q56 
1  Introduction 
Among the six dominant greenhouse gases mentioned by the UNFCCC,  carbon  dioxide 
emissions (CO2) are considered to have the strongest impact on climate change. In 2009, total 
global CO2 emissions amounted to 31.3 billion tonnes, an increase of almost 40% since 1990, 
the base year of the Kyoto Protocol. The very large regional variation in emission trends in 
2009 resulted in a 53% share of developing countries versus 44% for industrialised countries 
with mitigation targets for total greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto protocol. The 
2Annex B countries are due to cut emissions to an average of at least 5.2 percent below 1990 
levels (22.5 billion tonnes) by 2008-2012.
1 Although those countries reduced CO2
Given the current policy debate and the importance of evaluating the effectiveness in terms of 
emission reductions of the already established climate agreements, the main aim of this paper 
is to analyze to what extent emission reduction obligations from the Kyoto Protocol have an 
effect on CO
 emissions 
by about 7% in 2009, a large part of the decrease was due to a drop in economic activity in 
response to the crisis. Indeed, emissions could increase toward pre-recession levels  as 
developed countries recover their normal economic activity levels. 
2  emissions. In other words, how much more CO2
From a theoretical point of view, we base our analysis on the  so-called  Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) and on the STIRPAT model: a more elaborated version of the simple 
IPAT formulation proposed by Dietz and Rosa (1997). The EKC theory  hypothesizes  an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between per capita income and environmental degradation. 
With increasing income per capita environmental degradation first rises and after having 
reached a maximum level of degradation (the turning point) it starts to decline. Grossman and 
Krueger (1991, 1995), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) as well as Selden and Song (1994) 
were some of the first to find this relationship, which is derived from the work of Kuznets 
(1955) on economic growth and income inequality. As recently pointed out by Carson (2011), 
 would the countries have 
emitted in the absence of their Kyoto Protocol ratification. This question is important to 
evaluate present  international climate negotiations and to encourage future climate 
negotiations which could introduce binding emission reduction obligations to all countries 
without jeopardizing the growth of developing countries. 
1 The Annex B countries are industrialized countries which signed the Kyoto Protocol. Their emission reduction 
goals are mentioned in the Annex B of the treaty. For a list of all Annex B countries refer to Appendix 1.  
3the early EKC literature contributed to a shift of the IPAT view, which is shared by policy 
makers and environmentalists, away from that growth is associated with environmental 
degradation, towards the belief that economic growth can be good for the environment. After 
almost twenty years of EKC investigations,
2
Among the studies that analyze the relationship between income growth and CO
  the inverse U-shaped income-emissions 
relationship is far from being  an empirical fact and the recent literature recognizes that 
income affects enissions through other factors (Carson, 2011). In this sense, it is worth to 
investigate the underlying mechanisms through which, in some cases, the EKC prevails.  
2
The major contribution of the paper is to assess the impacts of the Kyoto protocol  by 
considering a broad sample of countries (213)  and by evaluating the role played by the 
Protocol in reducing CO
 emissions, 
to our knowledge only two of them have specifically considered the Kyoto Protocol as one of 
the underlying mechanisms that could be behind the EKC. In the first study, Mazzanti and 
Musolesi (2009) evaluate  the impact of time related factors, including policy events,  on 
carbon emissions and find that the income-emissions relationship is affected by policy events 
such as the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. A second investigation by 
Aichele and Felbermayr (2010) analyzes whether ratifying the Kyoto Protocol has an effect 
on the carbon content of bilateral trade and conclude that it can indeed lead to carbon leakage. 
However, none of them focus explicitly on the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
country coverage of both studies is limited. The first paper focuses only on EU countries and 
the second on 38 countries (27 facing binding emissions). This investigation attempts to fill 
these gaps. 
2
2 For a summary of earlier investigations see Appendix 2.  
 emissions in Annex B countries. With this aim, a dynamic panel-
data model is estimated that specifically considers the endogeneity of the policy variable. We 
4employ panel data methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity and use  as  external 
instrument for the Kyoto variable the number of financed CDM projects. The CDM as one of 
the flexible mechanisms from Kyoto Protocol is correlated with the emission reduction 
obligations of the investing country but not with its current CO2
The paper is structured as follows. International climate policy is briefly described in Section 
2. Section 3 discuses the measurement and sources of the data used and presents the empirical 
analysis and main findings. Finally, some concluding remarks are outlined in Section 4. 
 emissions. In this way we are 
able to interpret our estimates as causal effects. It is also worth noting that the fact that we use 
the STIRPAT approach and integrate it with the EKC approach helps bridge the gap between 
the literature in economics (where STIRPAT sees some use) and the larger environmental 
science and social science literature, where STIRPAT is very common.   
2  Literature Review 
2.1  Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol was prepared by the annual meetings of the UNFCCC and adopted for 
use at the 1997 meeting in Kyoto. The protocol divides the member countries into different 
groups: Annex-B with GHG emissions reduction obligations and the Non-Annex-B without 
emission reduction obligations. It covers the main GHGs such as CO2, which represents the 
biggest share, and five other GHGs. The goal of the protocol is a reduction of GHGs by 5.3% 
by 2012, compared to the countries’ emission levels in 1990. It finally entered into force in 
2005 after Russia’s ratification. It was then that the established prerequisite of at least 55 
countries emitting at least 55% of the global GHG emissions had ratified the treaty  was 
fulfilled. 
5The reason for the long delay between the adoption and the entering into force of the protocol 
was  related  to the question of  which countries should have binding emission reduction 
obligations and what are the estimated costs from these obligations.
3
The CDM opens the possibility to fulfill a country’s GHG emission reduction obligations 
with Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs) from any developing country which is a 
member of the UNFCCC. Hence, it works like a back door for the developed countries to get 
CERs to fulfill their obligations at low cost. The CDM aims at achieving four goals. First, it 
shall integrate developing countries in the international framework on environmental 
regulations without putting any costly obligations on those countries. Second, the mechanism 
opens new markets to those countries, or integrates those countries into a new market such as 
the international carbon market, which trades the CERs obtained from CDM projects. Third, 
the CDM could be a tool to achieve sustainable development among poorer countries. Finally, 
and probably most criticized but also most reasonable goal, emissions are reduced at the 
lowest cost possible. The technology applied in developed countries might be at a higher level 
of energy efficiency than the technology applied in developing countries (e. g. it could be 
possible to reduce five times more GHG emissions in China than in Germany with the same 
amount of money invested). 
  There was also  the 
question of how to incorporate and support developing countries, which in 1997 did  not 
account for a big share in emissions but now do. China for example saw strong increases in its 
emissions during recent years. To overcome the difficulty of how to integrate developing 
countries the Kyoto Protocol tries to enhance sustainable development among developing 
countries via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
3 For a list of the countries with emission commitments refer to appendix 3. 
6Swinton and Sarkar (2007) analyze costs and benefits for developing countries from the 
Kyoto Protocol and draw an optimistic perspective. Developing countries are integrated into 
international markets and can  exhibit comparative advantages  since they reduce GHG 
emissions at a lower unit cost. They can also attract foreign capital which creates positive side 
effects and can lead to a cleaner growth path. The integration in international environmental 
law may also  lead to an improvement in the developing countries institutions. Rose and 
Spiegel (2008) find engagement in non-economic agreements to be growth enhancing and that 
joint environmental interests do foster economic ties. They provide  evidence that non-
participation may lead to costs in terms of lower economic exchange in international trade and 
foreign direct investment. Aichele and Felbermayr (2010) analyze if the emission reduction 
obligations from Kyoto Protocol have an effect on the carbon content of bilateral trade. They 
find that ratifying the Protocol leads to an increase in the carbon content of imports, in other 
words, it leads to carbon leakage. 
2.2  The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis 
Since the first EKC studies, Grossman and Krueger (1991) and Roberts and Grimes (1997), 
much work relating pollution and emissions to income has been conducted - an excellent 
survey of early studies can be found in Stern (1998) - but the findings do not seem to support 
the EKC hypothesis in a general way. In particular, the results are strongly dependent on the 
pollutant indicators chosen as well as on the functional form estimated and the explanatory 
variables included in the regression. Most criticisms are related to the econometric techniques 
and the presence of omitted-variables bias (Perman and Stern, 2003). Borghesi and Vercelli 
(2003) state that the studies based on local emissions present acceptable results, whereas those 
concerning global emissions do not offer the expected outcomes. Therefore the EKC 
hypothesis cannot be generally accepted. Overviews of the most recent literature, covering 
different sources for the EKC hypothesis can be found in Stern (2004), Galeotti (2007) and 
7Carson (2011).  These  authors conclude that the model is misspecified, the underlying 
mechanisms are missing and the data used are of poor-quality and not always comparable. 
Concerning the studies that focus on CO2 per capita as dependent variable (listed in Appendix 
2), the results are also mixed. Most recent studies indicate that the EKC hypothesis is valid 
only for a subset of developed countries. Some studies which support this results are Panayotu 
et al. (2000), Bengochea et al. (2001), Dijkgraaf and Vollenbergh (2001),  Mazzanti and 
Musolesi (2009) and Lamla (2009). Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) find that policy events 
such as the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 may be part of the drivers of 
the robust EKC shapes they find for EU north countries, although the oil price shock in the 
1980’s and the following restructuring of the energy-economy may also play a role. Lamla 
(2009) also confirms an EKC for CO2
In many other studies the EKC hypothesis is rejected. In some cases because the turning point 
is out of sample (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Shi, 2003; York et al., 2003), in others 
because the relationship is  N-shaped (Moomaw and Unruh, 1997; Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Bengochea-Morancho, 2004) or because the squared income term is  not statistically 
significant (Agras and Chapman, 1999; Roca et al., 2001; Baiocchi and di Falco, 2001; 
Martínez-Zarzoso, 2009). Agras and Chapman (1999) control for past years emissions by 
applying a dynamic approach and find no EKC for CO
 for a small sample of countries and points to the 
importance to control for variables like population and technological change when analyzing 
the pollution-income relationship. 
2. York et al. (2003) extend the IPAT 
model with squared income per capita and find rising emissions with rising GDP but at a 
declining pace. Martínez-Zarzoso (2009) also does not find evidence for an EKC for CO2 
when controlling for population and technological change. 
8As stated by Barbier (1997) there is widespread interest on the part of academics in this 
analysis and on the part of policymakers in the resulting implications for environment and 
development. The  analysis of  the shape of the pollution-income relationship could be 
important for establishing public policies that target emissions reduction. But  even  more 
important is to recognize that if we cannot accept the EKC hypothesis in a general way, we 
could deduce that environmental intervention is needed because economic growth will not be 
the solution for all environmental problems. We would therefore like to know whether the 
actions taken, in form of international agreements or regulations, have positive implications 
for the environment. 
3  Empirical Analysis 
In this section we present the empirical model and the estimation results to evaluate the EKC 
hypothesis for CO2 and to test whether the Kyoto Protocol has an impact on CO2 emissions. 
We estimate an  EKC  version of the stochastic impact  from  population affluence and 
technology model (STIRPAT) as used by York et al. (2003) and Martínez-Zarzoso (2009). 
We will start the analysis with the traditional static regression model and then compare those 
results to a dynamic model. Given the revealed persistence of CO2
3.1  Model and Hypotheses 
 emissions a dynamic 
specification allows to account for the path-dependent nature of the distributional pattern 
(Agras and Chapman,  1999;  Martínez-Zarzoso and Maurotti, 2011)  and to distinguish 
between short and long term effects. 
Recent macroeconomic pollution-income regressions are more general than those in the EKC 
literature, not only because they include a variety of demographic and institutional variables 
but also because the population elasticity is allowed to differ from unity. Following York et al 
(2003), Shi (2003) and Cole and Neumayer (2004) amongst others, we specify a model in 
9which emissions are explained with income, population, industrialization and our policy 
variable. This framework is related to the STIRPAT model which has its origin in the IPAT 
formulation. 
Dietz and Rosa (1997) consider the rise in CO2 emissions to be mainly caused by human 
activities and apply an environmental impact model (IPAT) according to which all impacts of 
human activities (I) can be divided into four anthropogenic forces. These are considered to be 
the main driving forces behind the rise in CO2 emissions. The first one is population (P). The 
second is economic activity, which is referred to as affluence (A) in the model and which is 
measured in GDP per capita. The third is technology (T) which describes the technical 
standard of production and is measured in energy efficiency or industrial activity. Further 
determinants of CO2
The STIRPAT model, as initially proposed by Dietz and Rosa (1997), is given by, 
 are political and economic institutions as well as attitudes and beliefs. 
i i i i i T A P I ε α
δ γ β =                         (1) 
where P, A and T denote respectively population, affluence and technology and α, β, γ and δ 
are parameters to be estimated. The error term, which captures all the unexplained variance of 
the model, is denoted by ε. Finally, i stands for countries and indicates that the quantities of A, 
P, T and ε vary across countries. 
Dietz and Rosa (1997) include T in the error term and do not separately estimate the influence 
of technology on emissions, whereas York et al. (2003) extend the model and introduce T as 
another explanatory variable. By adding the time dimension and taking natural logarithms (ln) 
on both sides of equation 1, we obtain  
it it it it it T A P I µ δ γ β α + + + + = ln ln ln ln 0                   (2) 
10where α0 it it ε µ ln = =lnα and  . 
York et al. (2003) also investigate the introduction of further variables such as variables for 
institutions and squared variables to measure nonlinearities in the model. They lay  the 
foundation for the model specification which we apply 
it it it it it t i it KyotoOb IA GDP GDP P CO ν β β β β β λ α + + + + + + + = 5 4
2
3 2 1 2 ln ln ln ln ln       (3) 
where the dependent variable in (3) is CO2 i α  emissions measured in metric tons.   and  t λ  are 
country and year specific effects  that  control for unobservable country-heterogeneity and 
common time-varying effects that could affect emissions. Population is measured in number 
of inhabitants. Cramer (1998) and Cramer and Cheney (2000) are among the first to test 
whether the elasticity of emissions with respect to population is unity.
4
The variables GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared are a proxy for affluence and 
represent the corner stone of the analysis for the EKC.
 
5 The squared term accounts for non-
linearities of the pollution-income  relationship. Grossman and Krueger  (1995) as well as 
Harbaugh et al. (2002) find an N-shaped EKC for local pollutants.
6  As a proxy for 
technological change  we use  industrial activity (IA)  calculated by the share of the 
manufacturing industry in total GDP.
7
4 In the EKC approach it is assumed to be unity by using the logarithm of the pollutant in per capita terms. 
 We would assume that countries which are specialized 
on agricultural production facilities will show a low share and those who are in the stage of 
5 We followed the approach of Harbaugh et al. (2002) trying to identify the right empirical specification for the 
EKC. Nevertheless the selected quadratic specification did yield more robust results than the cubic specification 
of GDP per capita which was also estimated (the results are available upon request). 
6  They further introduce three-year averaged  lagged values of GDP to account for possible dynamics. We 
obtained non-significant results on those coefficients but we will account for possible effects from past GDP on 
present emissions by applying a dynamic panel data model. 
7 We also estimated different specifications using additional variables, namely energy efficiency (oil input per 
output in terms of GDP) and the number registered patents as a proxy technological change. The results were 
neither convincing nor did they fit into the scheme of the IPAT model in the case of the second variable. 
11industrialization will show a high share of manufactured goods in GDP. Developed countries 
might show already a low share if they specialized in service industries. 
In order to measure the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2
It could also  be argued that since the Protocol did  not come into force until 2005 when 
sufficient countries ratified it, it would make more sense to switch the dummy variable on in 
2005 for all countries. However, there are several reasons to support the argument that the 
dummy should be constructed using the ratification date and not the entry into force. First, the 
entry into force does not have immediate consequences and second, politics, the media and 
the voters are actors involved in the ratification process and it is after the ratification of the 
Protocol when the relevant domestic policy settings are fixed. 
 emissions we create the variable 
KyotoOb (Kyoto obligations) that takes the value one if a country has ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol and faces emission commitments from the treaty, otherwise it takes the value zero. 
This dummy variable takes the value one from the year in which the country has ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol  onwards. Most of the countries with emission commitments  ratified the 
protocol in 2002. It is worth to notice that a number of high income countries, namely the US, 
Israel, South Korea and Singapore did not ratify the Protocol and therefore the KyotoOb 
dummy is not highly correlated with the level of per capita income, making possibly the 
identification of separated effects.  
The main hypotheses are: 
1.  The variable  KyotoOb has  a negative effect on CO2
2. The EKC hypothesis is not generally valid for CO2 emissions. 
  emissions  and therefore  policy 
measures can have an influence on emissions. 
12In order to allow comparison, we first estimate Equation (3) by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
assuming that there is no unobserved heterogeneity across countries (αi=α) and assuming also 
common slope coefficients β  for all countries.
8  Due to the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity the estimated OLS coefficients are biased. Therefore, country specific effects 
(αi) are used to model the unobserved heterogeneity between the observed countries. We take 
account for those effects by estimating a random effects (RE) regression and testing with the 
Lagrange Multiplier test for the significance of country specific effects. The outcome of the 
test
9
The RE error component model assumes that the country specific effects α
 indicates that there are country specific effects to be taken into account. 
i are not correlated 
with the independent variables xit,  in other  words  E(xit  αi)=0. If this  assumption is not 
fulfilled, the RE coefficients are inconsistent and the unobserved heterogeneity should be 
modeled using the fixed effects (FE) estimator. The Hausman test
10
There are two further issues concerning the consistency of our model in Equation (3). One is 
heteroscedasticity in the error term, which could lead to consistent but inefficient estimates of 
the FE estimator. The second one refers to serial correlation in the error term. The error term 
of the current period ν
 suggests that the RE 
estimator is inconsistent and, consequently, we will continue with the FE estimator, which 
uses only the variation within countries over time, being  less efficient than the RE but 
consistent.  
it could be correlated with the error term of the previous period νit-1. We 
test for heteroscedasticity by applying the White test for heteroscedasticity and find the error 
term to be heteroscedastic.
11
8 The results of the OLS regression are reported in Appendix 6 column (1). 
 We further apply the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of first 
9 (chi2(1) = 22536.79 and Prob > chi2 = 0.00). 
10 (chi2(25) = 102.52 and Prob>chi2 = 0.00). 
11 The test is applied by a regression using as dependent variable the squared error term and as independent 
variables all the variables in the model plus the prediction from the FE model squared and in higher exponential 
13order which suggests that autocorrelation of order one is present in the error term.
12 To deal 
with both problems simultaneously, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, a  within FE 
estimator with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors is applied.
13
Next, to test for endogeneity of right-hand-side variables we apply the Durbin Wu Hausman 
test  and find our KyotoOb  variable to be endogenous.
 This approach allows us to adjust 
the model to an autocorrelation structure of order 1 (AR1) with  heteroscedastic-robust 
standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). 
14  Indeed, a  country with emission 
reduction obligations from the  Kyoto Protocol will tend to emit lower amounts of CO2 
emissions, but at the same time the ratification of the Kyoto protocol could also depend on the 
country’s CO2 emissions level. To overcome this endogeneity problem we instrument the 
variable KyotoOb with the number of CDM projects financed by the investing country. The 
CDM as one of the flexible mechanisms from Kyoto Protocol is correlated with the emission 
reduction obligations of the investing country but not with its current CO2
it it it it it it t i it CDM IA GDP GDP P KyotoOb ν β β β β β λ α + + + + + + + = 5 4
2
3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln
  emissions. 
Industrialized countries with high emission reduction obligations, such as the Netherlands, 
which at the same time face high emission reduction costs have  an incentive to reduce 
emissions abroad via the CDM. The first and second stages of the IV approach are 
      (4) 
it it it it it t i it KyotoOb IA GDP GDP P CO ν β β β β β λ α + + + + + + + = 5 4
2
3 2 1 2 ln ln ln ln ln       (5) 
The instrumental variable  approach  given by equations  (4) and (5)  accounts for the 
endogeneity of the variable KyotoOb  but it cannot account for heteroscedasticity or 
orders. Since the estimated coefficients for the added variables are significant, they explain some of the variance 
in the error term and we have to consider that the error terms is heteroscedastic. 
12 (F(1,161) = 55.829 and Prob > F = 0.00). 
13 The results are presented in Appendix 6, column (3). 
14 The endogeneity test result for  KyotoOb gives: (chi
2(31) = 425.11 and Prob>chi
2 = 0.00). 
14autocorrelation in the error term and it is therefore though consistent, inefficient (Baum et al. 
2003). Accounting for endogeneity, the estimated coefficient of the variable KyotoOb is also 
negatively  signed  but  higher  in magnitude (0.30 versus  0.20) as shown in  Appendix 6, 
columns 3 and 4. It is worth noting that the effect is under-estimated when endogeneity is not 
modeled.  
Next, we specify a dynamic approach that assumes that today’s CO2 emissions are driven by 
past emissions. To measure this impact we introduce last year’s CO2 emissions lnCO2it-1
it it it it it it it t it CDM IA GDP GDP P CO KyotoOb ν β β β β β β λ α + + + + + + + + = − 6 5
2
4 3 2 1 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln ln
 as 
additional explanatory variables in the model: 
   (6) 
it it it it it it t it KyotoOb IA GDP GDP P CO CO ν β β β β β β λ α + + + + + + + + = − 6 5
2
4 3 2 1 2 1 2 ln ln ln ln ln ln    (7) 
Equations  (6) and (7)  are estimated using the  difference-  and system-GMM estimators 
proposed by Arellano and Bond  (1991)  and Blundell and Bond(1998)  that  allow for an 
efficient estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form (Baum et al., 
2003). Fixed-effect dynamic models suffer from an endogeneity bias of the lagged dependent 
variable. Since lnCO2it is a function of νit, then lnCO2it-1 will be a function of νit as well and is 
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intuition of the GMM is to find the estimator which solves  . The instruments have to 
fulfill two conditions. They have to be correlated with the instrumented variables and they 
should not be correlated with the error terms.  The system-GMM estimator proposed  by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) uses the lagged differences of the variables as instruments for the 
variables in levels and the lagged levels of the variables as instruments for the variable in first 
15differences,  and is therefore considered more efficient than the IV-GMM by Baum et al. 
(2003), based on Arellano and Bond (1991).
15
3.2  Data 
 
The data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010 and covers a panel of 
213 countries from 1960 until 2009. For the data on CO2 emissions we referred to the Carbon 
Dioxide Information Analysis Center CDIAC.
16 The panel is not balanced since the data on 
CO2 emissions for economies in transition is only available from 1992 onwards. The data on 
the  Kyoto Protocol ratification and the CO2  emission reduction obligations is  from the 
UNFCCC (2010) and data on the number of financed CDM projects by country comes from 
the UNEP Risoe Centre (2010).
17 Emissions of CO2 are steadily increasing over time for the 
whole period and set of countries. The high and upper-middle income countries emit a much 
higher amount of CO2 and show a stronger volatility. The low income countries emitted in 
2004 about one fifth of the amount of CO2
3.3  Main Results 
  in kilo tons compared to the high income 
countries. Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Appendix 
5. 
We selected the dynamic model as more appropriate than the static one given the statistically 
significance of the lagged dependent variable in all specifications. The  system-GMM 
15 We also apply panel unit-root tests for the variables in levels and in first differences. We are able to reject the 
presence of a unit root for the dependent variable; meanwhile we find mixed results for the independent variables 
in levels. By first-differencing the series, the tests indicate that all the variables are stationary. Results are 
available upon request. 
16 The CO2 emission data includes emissions from solid, liquid as well as gas fuel consumption and emissions 
from cement production as well as gas flaring. 
17 To analyze differences between high, middle and low income countries we grouped countries according to 
their GNI (results available upon request). Economies are divided according to 2009 GNI per capita, calculated 
using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $995 or less; lower middle income, $996 - 
$3,945; upper middle income, $3,946 - $12,195; and high income, $12,196 or more. The results are available 
upon request. 
16estimator  is  the preferred estimator  since it is more efficient  than the difference GMM 
estimator. The short and long run elasticities of the model are reported in column (2) of Table 
1.
18
Table 1  Main Results of the Dynamic Model  
  
The long run coefficient of population is about unity and the coefficients of GDP per capita 
show evidence of an environmental Kuznets Curve. Our variable of interest KyotoOb has a 
long run coefficient of -0.28 that is significant at a 10% level for a one sided test.
19 A country 
that ratified the Kyoto Protocol will emit on average 24.5% less CO2  in the long term, ceteris 
paribus (than the same country without emission reductions obligations).
20 As a robustness 
check in column (3) we let our dummy for Kyoto obligations turn one if a country did ratify 
the protocol and faces emission reduction obligations compared to their GHG levels in 
1990.
21  The new KyotoOb  variable shows a higher coefficient  that is now statistically 
significant at the five percent level. The  sign and significance of the other  estimated 
coefficients remain almost unchanged. Therefore as regards our first hypothesis, we obtain 
that the variable KyotoOb has a negative and significant effect on emissions. Hence, a country 
with emission reduction obligations emits on average around 3 percent less CO2 in the short 
run and around 50 percent less CO2 in the long run than a country without obligations.
22
18 The long-run elasticities are calculated as βxit/(1-βCO2it-1). 
 
Figure 1 displays graphically how emissions developed for high income countries with and 
without emission reduction obligations from the Kyoto Protocol and shows that they diverge 
19 Since we assume a negative coefficient we can apply a one sided test. 
20 We estimate a semilogarithmic model with a dummy variable. The marginal effect of the KyotoOb variable is 
calculated as (exp(-0.28)-1)*100=-24.5%. 
21 Some countries like New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Norway, Australia, Iceland, Finland, France, 
Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal are allowed to keep their emissions levels or expand them compared to 
1990. 
22 Since most of the countries with emission reduction obligations ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, we 
introduce interaction terms for the variable KyotoOb and the years 2001 to 2007, to see if there are year specific 
effects (see Appendix 6, column (1) and (2)). Those interaction terms turned out to be not significant in the 
preferred specification and therefore are not reported. 
17from 1992 onward. Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) find as well an effect of the Kyoto Protocol 
on CO2
Figure 1  CO
 emissions for the northern EU country group. In fact, they state that the inverted U-
shape relationship between emissions and GDP is, according to their results, driven by policy 
events such as the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and price shocks such as the oil price shock 
in the1980’s. 
2
With respect to our second hypothesis (EKC) the GDP variables indicate that emissions first 
increase with rising GDP and after some turning point they decline with rising GDP. We find 
an inverted U-shape as in Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009); however, the turning point at an 
annual average GDP per capita of $209,452 is out of sample. Most of the countries studied 
face rising emissions with rising income, since the maximum GDP per capita of the sample is 
$95,434  (PPP adjusted).  Figure  2  displays the pollution-income relationship for four 
countries. 
 Emissions in Countries with and without Emission Commitments 
Figure 2  Scatter Plot CO2
While the Netherlands face rising emissions with rising income but at a slower path, Brazil, 
China and India face rising steeply emissions with rising income. The graphs explain the 
position of the individual countries on the inverted U-curve. Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) 
also find a quadratic relationship between CO
 and Income 
2 emissions and income. Similar to our study 
they obtain insignificant income variables when applying a cubic specification. They find an 
inverted U-curve for the group of northern European countries with turning points around 
$13000
23
23 In 1995 constant USD. 
. The different in results might be due to the grouping of countries done by Mazzanti 
18and Musolesi (2009) and their smaller sample. Compared to our sample they analyze mostly 
high income countries divided into three groups.
24
Our results are in line with the literature which states that there is an EKC for some countries 
(mainly high income countries which took early actions in environmental policies). Mazzanti 
and Musolesi (2009) do mostly consider countries with emission reduction obligations from 
Kyoto Protocol. We apply a potentially more comprehensive model specification of the EKC 
on a larger panel of countries and contribute to the literature by controlling  for  the 
endogeneity of the Kyoto variable. 
 
4  Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed and tested two relevant hypotheses. First, we tested for an effect of 
the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. Our long run elasticity estimates indicate that countries 
with emission commitments from the Kyoto Protocol emit on average 24.5 percent less CO2 
than similar countries that did not ratify the Protocol. We conclude that there is a potential 
effect from the Kyoto policy on emissions in those countries. Since the number of countries 
which ratified the protocol and face emission commitments is rather small compared to the 
number of countries which did not ratify the protocol and those which do not face any 
emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, a matter of concern is whether we can 
indeed attribute the whole estimated effect to the Kyoto Protocol. It could be argued that the 
Annex I countries would have been doing the most to tackle their CO2
24 In an earlier version of the paper we also divide the sample into four sub-samples by income group. We come 
to the conclusion that analyzing the full sample and controlling for country fixed effects provides more robust 
results. 
 emissions, even in the 
absence of the protocol. Indeed it is often claimed that regulatory stringency is a positive 
function of per capita income and in the last decade many developed countries have been 
19taking action to reduce emissions, irrespective of the modest commitments required by the 
protocol. In this line, we leave for further research the inclusion in the model of better proxies 
for regulatory stringency that will help to support our findings. We argue in our favour that 
per capita GDP was used as a proxy for regulatory stringency and that the estimated effect 
(24.5%) is a long-run elasticity, whereas the short-run effect is much smaller (around 2 %) 
Assuming that our identification strategy of the causal effect, using external instruments, is 
valid, we should obtain an accurate estimation of the Kyoto effect. 
Second, we examined the EKC hypothesis for a cross-section of 163 countries over a period 
of 28 years. Our findings indicate that an inverted-U relationship exists among some high-
income  countries  such as Germany or Belgium, whereas  for  middle-  and low-income 
countries there is no evidence for future declining emissions with rising income. The transfer 
of end-of-pipe technology could contribute to make growth in those countries greener and 
avoid high emission levels, which may cause irreversible damage. 
To stabilize global warming at a 2 degrees Celsius much stronger measures will have to be 
taken.  Although emissions from the developed countries with reduction obligations have 
declined and some countries like France, the UK and Germany have been successful in 
meeting their targets, the decline in emissions is unlikely to be enough to stabilize levels of 
GHG in the atmosphere. Emissions from emerging countries, namely China and India, are 
expected to increase substantially in the near future. Even if the involved developed countries 
achieve the Kyoto target in 2012, this can only be considered a partially successful agreement 
that is not going to be sufficient to solve the global warming problem. Possible solutions 
could  be  to integrate more countries in the  treaty, including developing countries,  or to 
establish an international carbon tax on GHG emissions. Since the first commitment round of 
the Kyoto Protocol will close in 2012 and we observe large emission reductions which are due 
20to the Protocol, it would be desirable to establish as soon as possible effective measures and 
mechanisms for the next phase, which will cover the period after 2012.  
Finally, we would like to close the discussion by pointing out that according to our findings 
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Table 1  Results Dynamic Model 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  
 
IV-GMM  System GMM   System GMM  
VARIABLES  lnCO lnCO 2  lnCO 2 
  
2 
short run  long run  short run  long run  short run  long run 
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  Endogenity Test  5.106 
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  Sargan Test 









  ABond AR(1) 









  ABond AR(2) 














  No. 





  No. Countries  162     163     163    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hansen, Sargan and, 
Endogeneity and A-Bond test for autocorrelation report p-values in parenthesis.  
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Appendix 1  List of Annex B Countries from the Kyoto Protocol 
Annex B  Annex B 
Australia  Latvia 
Austria  Lithuania 
Belgium  Luxembourg 
Bulgaria  Netherlands 
Canada  New Zealand 
Croatia  Norway 
Czech Republic  Poland 
Denmark  Portugal 
Estonia  Romania 
Finland  Russian Federation 
France (including Monaco)  Slovakia 
Germany  Slovenia 
Greece  Spain 
Hungary  Sweden 
Iceland  Switzerland (including Liechtenstein) 
Ireland  Ukraine 
Italy (including San Marino)  United Kingdom 
Japan  United States of America 
Source: UNFCCC (1997), 20. 
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Appendix 2  Literature on the Relationship between CO2
Authors 
 and Income 
Turning Points   EKC  Countries 
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992)  $7 Million  No  118-153 
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995)  $35428 (level) - $8 Million $35000  Yes  108 
Tucker (1995)  Decreasing over Time  In 11 Years  137 
Sengupta (1996)  $8740  Yes  16 Developed and Developing  
Cole, Rayner and Bates (1997)  $25100 (levels) - $62700 (logs)  Yes  7 World Regions 
Dietz and Rosa (1997)  $10000  Yes (for 25%)   111 
Moomaw and Unruh (1997)  $12813  N-Shaped  16 Developed   
Roberts and Grimes (1997)  $8000 - $10000  Yes, after the 70s  Developed and Developing 
Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998)  Within sample  Yes   141 
Agras and Chapman (1999)  $13630   No  34 
Galeotti and Lanza (1999)  $15073- $21757  Yes  110 
Panayotou, Peterson and Sachs (2000)  $29732 -$40906 (1950-1990)  Yes for Developed  17 Developed 
Heerink et al. (2001)  $68871  Yes  118-153 
Roca et al. (2001)  GDP non significant   No   Spain 
Baiocchi and di Falco (2001)  GDP non significant  No   160 
Bengochea et al. (2001)  $24427 - $73170  For some Countries  UE 
Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2001)  $20647  Yes 5 Rich Countries  24 OECD 
Shi (2003)  Out of sample  Yes  93 
York et al. (2003)  $61000 (out of sample)  No  146 
Martínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-
Morancho (2004)  $4914 - $18364  N-Shaped  22 OECD  
Lamla (2009)  $80000  Yes  47 Countries 
Martínez-Zarzoso (2009)  GDP2 non significant  No  121 
Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009)  $12000 - $236000  Yes for EU North  21 
Source: Authors and Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007), p.508, f. 
 
29Appendix 3  List of countries which had ratified Kyoto Protocol by 22.08.2011  
Country  Ratification Date  GHG Obligation in % Compared to 1990 
ALBANIA   4/1/2005 
  ALGERIA   2/16/2005 
  ANGOLA   5/8/2007 
  ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA   11/3/1998 
  ARGENTINA   9/28/2001 
  ARMENIA   4/25/2003 
  AUSTRALIA*   12/12/2007  8.00 
AUSTRIA *   5/31/2002  -13.00 
AZERBAIJAN   9/28/2000 
  BAHAMAS   4/9/1999 
  BAHRAIN   1/31/2006 
  BANGLADESH   10/22/2001 
  BARBADOS   8/7/2000 
  BELARUS*   8/26/2005 
  BELGIUM*   5/31/2002  -7.50 
BELIZE   9/26/2003 
  BENIN   2/25/2002 
  BHUTAN   8/26/2002 
  BOLIVIA   11/30/1999 
  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA   4/16/2007 
  BOTSWANA   8/8/2003 
  BRAZIL   8/23/2002 
  BRUNEI DARUSSALAM   8/20/2009 
  BULGARIA*   8/15/2002  -8.00 
BURKINA FASO   3/31/2005 
  BURUNDI   10/18/2001 
  CAMBODIA   8/22/2002 
  CAMEROON   8/28/2002 
  CANADA*   12/17/2002  -6.00 
CAPE VERDE   2/10/2006 
  CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC   3/18/2008 
  CHAD   8/18/2009 
  CHILE   8/26/2002 
  CHINA   8/30/2002 
  COLOMBIA   11/30/2001 
  COMOROS   4/10/2008 
  CONGO   2/12/2007 
  COOK ISLANDS   8/27/2001 
  COSTA RICA   8/9/2002 
  COTE D'IVOIRE   4/23/2007 
  CROATIA*   5/30/2007  -5.00 
CUBA   4/30/2002 
  CYPRUS   7/16/1999 
  CZECH REPUBLIC*   11/15/2001  -8.00 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA   4/27/2005 
  DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO   3/23/2005 
  DENMARK*   5/31/2002  -21.00 
DJIBOUTI   3/12/2002 
  DOMINICA   1/25/2005 
  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC   2/12/2002 
  ECUADOR   1/13/2000 
  EGYPT   1/12/2005 
  EL SALVADOR   11/30/1998 
  EQUATORIAL GUINEA   8/16/2000 
  ERITREA   7/28/2005 
  ESTONIA*   10/14/2002  -8.00 
ETHIOPIA   4/14/2005 
  EUROPEAN UNION   5/31/2002 
  FIJI   9/17/1998 
 
30FINLAND*   5/31/2002  0.00 
FRANCE*  5/31/2002  0.00 
GABON   12/12/2006 
  GAMBIA   6/1/2001 
  GEORGIA   6/16/1999 
  GERMANY*   5/31/2002  -21.00 
GHANA   5/30/2003 
  GREECE*   5/31/2002  25.00 
GRENADA   8/6/2002 
  GUATEMALA   10/5/1999 
  GUINEA   9/7/2000 
  GUINEA-BISSAU   11/18/2005 
  GUYANA   8/5/2003 
  HAITI   7/6/2005 
  HONDURAS   7/19/2000 
  HUNGARY*   8/21/2002  -6.00 
ICELAND *   5/23/2002  10.00 
INDIA   8/26/2002 
  INDONESIA   12/3/2004 
  IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)   8/22/2005 
  IRAQ   7/28/2009 
  IRELAND*   5/31/2002  13.00 
ISRAEL   3/15/2004 
  ITALY *   5/31/2002  -6.50 
JAMAICA   6/28/1999 
  JAPAN *   6/4/2002  -6.00 
JORDAN   1/17/2003 
  KAZAKHSTAN   6/19/2009 
  KENYA   2/25/2005 
  KIRIBATI   9/7/2000 
  KUWAIT   3/11/2005 
  KYRGYZSTAN   5/13/2003 
  LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC   2/6/2003 
  LATVIA*   7/5/2002  -8.00 
LEBANON   11/13/2006 
  LESOTHO   9/6/2000 
  LIBERIA   11/5/2002 
  LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA   8/24/2006 
  LIECHTENSTEIN *   12/3/2004  -8.00 
LITHUANIA *   1/3/2003  -8.00 
LUXEMBOURG *   5/31/2002  -28.00 
MADAGASCAR   9/24/2003 
  MALAWI   10/26/2001 
  MALAYSIA   9/4/2002 
  MALDIVES   12/30/1998 
  MALI   3/28/2002 
  MALTA   11/11/2001 
  MARSHALL ISLANDS   8/11/2003 
  MAURITANIA   7/22/2005 
  MAURITIUS   5/9/2001 
  MEXICO   9/7/2000 
  MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)   6/21/1999 
  MONACO   2/27/2006 
  MONGOLIA   12/15/1999 
  MONTENEGRO   6/4/2007 
  MOROCCO   1/25/2002 
  MOZAMBIQUE   1/18/2005 
  MYANMAR   8/13/2003 
  NAMIBIA   9/4/2003 
  NAURU   8/16/2001 
  NEPAL   9/16/2005 
  NETHERLANDS *   5/31/2002  -6.00 
NEW ZEALAND   12/19/2002 
 
31NICARAGUA   11/18/1999 
  NIGER   9/30/2004 
  NIGERIA   12/10/2004 
  NIUE   5/6/1999 
  NORWAY *   5/30/2002  1.00 
OMAN   1/19/2005 
  PAKISTAN   1/11/2005 
  PALAU   12/10/1999 
  PANAMA   3/5/1999    
PAPUA NEW GUINEA   3/28/2002    
PARAGUAY   8/27/1999    
PERU   9/12/2002    
PHILIPPINES   11/20/2003    
POLAND *   12/13/2002  -6.00 
PORTUGAL *   5/31/2002  27.00 
QATAR   1/11/2005    
REPUBLIC OF KOREA   11/8/2002    
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA   4/22/2003    
ROMANIA *   3/19/2001  -8.00 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION *   11/18/2004  0.00 
RWANDA   7/22/2004    
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS   4/8/2008    
SAINT LUCIA   8/20/2003    
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES   12/31/2004    
SAMOA   11/27/2000    
SAN MARINO   4/28/2010    
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE   4/25/2008    
SAUDI ARABIA   1/31/2005    
SENEGAL   7/20/2001    
SERBIA  10/19/2007    
SEYCHELLES   7/22/2002    
SIERRA LEONE   11/10/2006    
SINGAPORE   4/12/2006    
SLOVAKIA *   5/31/2002  -8.00 
SLOVENIA *   8/2/2002    
SOLOMON ISLANDS   3/13/2003    
SOMALIA   7/26/2010    
SOUTH AFRICA   7/31/2002    
SPAIN *   5/31/2002  15.00 
SRI LANKA   9/3/2002    
SUDAN   11/2/2004    
SURINAME   9/25/2006    
SWAZILAND   1/13/2006    
SWEDEN *   5/31/2002  4.00 
SWITZERLAND *   7/9/2003  -8.00 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC   1/27/2006    
TAJIKISTAN   12/29/2008    
THAILAND   8/28/2002    
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA   11/18/2004    
TIMOR-LESTE   10/14/2008    
TOGO   7/2/2004    
TONGA   1/14/2008    
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO   1/28/1999    
TUNISIA   1/22/2003    
TURKEY *   5/28/2009    
TURKMENISTAN   1/11/1999    
TUVALU   11/16/1998    
UGANDA   3/25/2002    
UKRAINE *   4/12/2004  0.00 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES   1/26/2005    
UK AND NORTHERN IRELAND *   5/31/2002  -12.50 
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA   8/26/2002    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *      -7.00 
32URUGUAY   2/5/2001    
UZBEKISTAN   10/12/1999    
VANUATU   7/17/2001    
VENEZUELA   2/18/2005    
VIET NAM   9/25/2002    
YEMEN   9/15/2004    
ZAMBIA   7/7/2006    
ZIMBABWE   6/30/2009    




Appendix 4  Cross Correlations of the Variables 
   lnCO lnPop   2  lnGDP  lnAI  KyotoOb  CDM   High Inc.  Up.-Mid. Inc.  Low.-Mid. Inc.  Low. Inc. 
lnCO 1  2 
                 
lnPop   0.7665  1 
               
lnGDP  0.5004  -0.1009  1 
             
lnIA  0.5642  0.4368  0.2821  1 
           
KyotoOb  0.1998  0.0639  0.2809  0.1234  1 
         
CDM  0.0873  0.0512  0.1031  0.0214  0.2833  1 
       
High Inc.  0.3898  -0.02  0.7223  0.1333  0.2757  0.1185  1 
     
Up.-Mid. Inc.  0.0429  -0.1368  0.259  0.1414  -0.0111  -0.0345  -0.2959  1 
   
Low.-Mid. Inc.  -0.0457  0.0369  -0.2212  -0.0099  -0.1237  -0.0403  -0.3378  -0.3689  1 
 
Low. Inc.  -0.3649  0.1163  -0.7105  -0.2572  -0.1199  -0.0355  -0.2975  -0.325  -0.3709  1 
Source: WDI, CDIAC and UNEP (2010). 
 
Appendix 5  Summary Statistics 
Variable     Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Observations 








41424.33  -450861.1  1220606  T = 42.3384 








3.21E+07  -5.09E+08  5.21E+08  T-bar =  46.681 








3153.71  -11633.27  51962.45  T-bar = 26.6348 








3.692319  -5.448036  37.25037  T-bar = 28.5866 








0.1393166  -0.1407104  0.9613305  T-bar = 48.9155 




1.85398  0  22.64583  n =     213 
   within     6.615572  -22.36908  432.6309  T = 47.3803 
Source: WDI, CDIAC and UNEP (2010) 
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Appendix 6  Results Static Model 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  OLS  Within  Within ar het  IV Within 
   lnCO lnCO 2  lnCO 2  lnCO 2 
lnPop 
2 
1.053***  0.828***  1.197***  0.799*** 
 
(0.00613)  (0.198)  (0.0446)  (0.0962) 
lnGDP  2.512***  1.287**  1.028***  1.250*** 
 
(0.238)  (0.530)  (0.243)  (0.186) 
lnGDP -0.0878*** 
2  -0.0274  -0.00676  -0.0251** 
 
(0.0134)  (0.0326)  (0.0136)  (0.0116) 
lnIA  0.175***  0.246***  0.220***  0.246*** 
 
(0.0227)  (0.0445)  (0.0268)  (0.0204) 
KyotoOb  0.118  -0.0852***  -0.207***  -0.306** 
 
(0.164)  (0.0257)  (0.0578)  (0.131) 
Up.-mid. Inc.  -0.385*** 
     
 
(0.0468) 
      Low.-mid. Inc.  -0.349*** 
     
 
(0.0681) 
      Low Income  -0.748*** 
     
 
(0.109) 
      KyotoOb 2001  0.158 
     
 
(0.177) 
      KyotoOb 2002  -0.395**  -0.0987*** 
   
 
(0.189)  (0.0283) 
    KyotoOb 2003  -0.361*  -0.117*** 
   
 
(0.189)  (0.0295) 
    KyotoOb 2004  -0.276  -0.140*** 
   
 
(0.194)  (0.0344) 
    KyotoOb 2005  -0.282  -0.171*** 
   
 
(0.194)  (0.0387) 
    KyotoOb 2006  -0.209  -0.191*** 
   
 
(0.198)  (0.0446) 
    KyotoOb 2007 
 
-0.273*** 
   
   
(0.0488) 
    Constant  -23.64***  -14.62***  -19.69***  -14.01*** 
 
(1.072)  (3.305)  (0.997)  (1.847) 
Time Dum.  yes  yes  no  yes 
Observations  3,537  3,537  3,537  3,537 
R-squared  0.933  0.584 
    Countries     163  163  163 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 